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Abstract 
Several previous papers have marked the United States as an outlier: high poverty rates, low 
public social spending but high private social expenditures; a rather strong belief that people 
are poor because of laziness or lack of will; and remarkable differences across the States due 
to state discretion. With that established context in-mind, this paper analyzes U.S. welfare in 
more detail; focusing on the impact of TANF; part of the major welfare reform that took 
place in the United States in 1996.  
U.S. welfare reform emphasized an American preference for work; and it was a move further 
away from the strategies other “wealthy” nations use to address poverty. Initially U.S. 
welfare reform did serve in part to increase work participation, although the earnings of most 
individuals who left welfare were still below the poverty line, even many years after their 
exit. We found huge variation of welfare eligibility rights across states, depending on the 
state’s ability to pay and preferences to meet a certain level of social standard or other 
(social) objectives such as child care, work support and employment programs. 
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“No one who works full-time and has children at home should be poor anymore. 
No one who can work should be able to stay on welfare forever.” 
(Presidential candidate Clinton, 1992 campaign speech) 
 
“In the absences of a renewed antipoverty effort, many households will continue 
to be unable to afford adequate food, housing, and shelter. Our high poverty rate 
contributes to an erosion of social cohesion, a waste of the human capital of a 
portion of our citizenry, and the moral discomfort of condoning poverty amidst 
affluence.” 
(Scholz, Moffit, and Cowan, 2008, 31) 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996 the United States passed large-scale welfare reform through the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 
significantly changing the way the nation supports its neediest residents. Welfare 
reform impacted Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and most notably it 
ended the U.S.’s largest cash-based assistance program, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with a new program focused on work 
participation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). To appreciate 
the successes and failures of TANF, it is first important to understand the intended 
outcomes of the program, the tenants of the program’s rules and how they differ 
from AFDC, and TANF’s place within the context of poverty reduction strategies 
in the United States.  
This paper, part of a series of research papers exploring cross-country 
poverty reduction strategies, follows work that established the United States as an 
outlier in comparison with other “wealthy” nations, with relatively high poverty 
and relatively low rates of social spending.1 This article takes a detailed look at 
TANF, in part because of the prominence of its role in the U.S. safety net, and in 
part because the passage of PRWORA represents a shift in U.S. policy that moves 
the nation further away from the poverty reduction strategies being implemented 
in other wealthy, developed nations. 
 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, while not the largest cash 
transfer program in the United States,2 is the only direct cash assistance program 
                                            
1  K. Caminada and M. Martin, 'Differences in Anti-Poverty Approaches Between Europe and 
The United States: A Cross-Atlantic Descriptive Policy Analysis', Poverty & Public Policy, 
vol. 3, Issue 2, Article 3, 2011, pp. 1-17. 
2  The Earned Income Tax Credit is the largest cash-transfer program serving low-income 
working families at the federal level. In 2012, EITC served 27.8 million families, amounting to 
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that serves the nonelderly and those who are not disabled. While there are several 
in-kind monthly supports to families, TANF is the only mechanism for providing 
cash directly to poor families in order to supplement their income on a monthly 
basis.3  
This paper begins with a brief primer on U.S. means-tested safety net 
programs for the nonelderly and trends in U.S. safety net spending (Section 2) as 
a way to provide context around U.S. safety net programs including both cash 
transfers and in-kind benefits. It then provides an overview of TANF (Section 3) 
that includes the policy’s objectives and a detailed account of the policy’s 
components. Section 4 moves to an evaluation of TANF through a literature 
review providing insight on some of the major successes and failures of TANF, 
organized by theme, followed by (Section 5) the conclusion.  
 
 
2 U.S. SAFETY NET  
 
2.1 Means-Tested Benefits4 
 
This section serves as a primer on U.S. means-tested, safety net programs. 
We focus solely on the primary means-tested benefits, because these programs 
have explicit antipoverty goals. Means-tested programs are financed by general 
tax revenues, and all restrict benefits to those whose incomes and/or assets fall 
below an established threshold. Some are entitlements—all who satisfy the 
stipulated eligibility requirements get benefits, regardless of the total budgetary 
cost (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). Other means-tested 
programs, nonentitlements, provide benefits only until the funds allocated by 
Congress or a state are spent even if some eligible participants are not served 
(e.g., TANF).  
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of means-tested (antipoverty) 
spending.5 Note that there has been a sharp reduction in cash entitlements for poor 
families in past decades in the United States. The nature of programs has changed 
as well: cash welfare benefits, for example, have been tied to work requirements; 
                                                                                                                       
a total of $64 billion dollars in benefits. See, for details, G. Falk, “The Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC): An Overview,” Congressional Research Service, 2014.  
3  Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides support to elderly and disabled individuals 
through supplemental monthly income; however, because this program’s eligibility does not 
include all families below an established income threshold, we do not address it directly in this 
paper. 
4  This section summarizes a comprehensive study of Scholz et al. (2008) on trends in income 
support in the United States. See J.K. Scholz, R. Moffitt, and B. Cowan, “Trends in Income 
Support,” Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper 1350-08 (2008), Madison. 
5  Annex A presents figures for Supplemental Security Income as well. 
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partly in response to evolving views about the nature of the poverty problem, 
responsibility for antipoverty policy has also broadened from the antipoverty 
agencies of the federal government to those in the U.S. States and to the tax code, 
as evidenced by the move to TANF and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
 
Table 1. Total Means-tested Benefits by Program, 1970-2007 
 
 AFDC/T
ANF 
EITC Medicaid Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School Food 
Programs 
WIC Head 
Start 
  
Constant 2007 dollars, billions 
1970 26.5  28.3 3.0 2.7 3.6  1.7 
1975 36.6 4.8 51.8 16.9 8.2 7.4 0.3 1.6 
1980 33.8 5.0 65.5 21.9 13.8 9.1 1.8 1.8 
1985 31.5 4.0 78.9 20.7 22.0 7.3 2.9 2.1 
1990 34.9 12.0 116.9 22.4 24.6 7.1 3.4 2.5 
1995 40.9 35.3 197.1 31.0 37.3 8.5 4.7 4.8 
2000 27.2 38.9 242.7 18.0 34.7 9.1 4.8 6.3 
2005 22.0 45.0 332.8 30.3 40.0 10.6 5.3 7.3 
2006 21.1  319.5 31.0 39.1 10.5 5.2 7.0 
2007      30.3 39.4 10.9 5.5   
  
Index: 1980 = 100 
1970 78  43 14 20 40  94 
1975 108 96 79 77 59 81 17 89 
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1985 93 80 120 95 159 80 161 117 
1990 103 240 178 102 178 78 189 139 
1995 121 706 301 142 270 93 261 267 
2000 80 778 371 82 251 100 267 350 
2005 65 900 508 138 290 116 294 406 
2006 62  488 142 283 115 289 389 
2007      138 286 120 306   
 
Abbreviations: AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families; EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children. 
 
Source: Scholz et al. (2008, 48-49). 
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Figure 1. Expenditures in 2015 on Low-Income Programs 
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Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015  
 
Cash-Based Benefits. In the United States there are two major means-tested cash-
based antipoverty programs: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). It is important to note that when 
AFDC was replaced with TANF, several other support mechanisms were added; 
TANF does not exclusively provide cash transfers to families. 
 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the central safety 
net program for poor families with children from 1936 to 1996. This program was 
directed primarily at single-parent families, although some two-parent families 
with an unemployed parent received benefits. In 1996 the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families Block Grant (TANF) was created. A five-year lifetime limit 
was imposed on receipt cash assistance (some hardship exemptions were 
allowed), and States had to meet targets for moving recipients into work activities. 
Note—for now—that benefits for ADFC/TANF declined from a peak of about 
$40 billion in 1995 to about $17 billion in 2014. 
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In contrast, expenditures on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) have 
grown sharply from $5 billion in 1975 to $64 billion in 2012. No other federal 
antipoverty program has grown so rapidly. The EITC is now the U.S.’s largest 
cash antipoverty program. The incentives embedded in the EITC differ from those 
in AFDC/TANF. AFDC recipients with no earnings received the largest welfare 
payments. In contrast, the EITC encourages less-skilled workers to enter the labor 
market, since nonearners do not receive the credit and the EITC amount rises with 
earnings up to about the poverty line. 
 
In-Kind Benefits. The safety net for low-income families in the United States also 
includes in-kind benefit programs, the primary of which are Medicaid, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—frequently referred to as 
food stamps, housing assistance, Head Start, school nutrition programs, and the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).  
 With joint funding from the federal government and the states, Medicaid is 
a public health insurance program that provides health coverage for low-income 
individuals and families. Medicaid is an entitlement program; however, income is 
not the only measure for eligibility. States administer their own Medicaid 
programs within the broad guidance provided by the federal government; 
therefore, across the States there are varying eligibility requirements and benefit 
levels. The Affordable Care Act, actually two bills enacted in 2010, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152), ushered in a number of 
changes to the Medicaid program including, creating a minimum Medicaid 
income eligibility level across the U.S. and establishing that coverage for any 
newly eligible adults will be fully funded by the federal government for three 
years and then will phase down to 90 percent by the year 2020.  
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is designed to 
enable low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. 
Between 1994 and 2000, real food stamp expenditures fell to $18 billion from $32 
billion, even though only modest changes to food stamp program rules were made 
through welfare reform. In fiscal year 2013, federal expenditures for SNAP ($79 
billion) and participation in the program were the highest they have ever been. In 
an average month that year, about one in seven U.S. residents received SNAP 
benefits. Almost two-thirds of the growth in spending on SNAP benefits between 
2007 and 2013 stemmed from the increase in the number of participants. Labor 
market conditions deteriorated dramatically between 2007 and 2009 and were 
slow to recover; since 2007, both the number of people eligible for the program 
and the share of those who are eligible and who participate in the program have 
risen. About one-fifth of the growth in spending can be attributed to temporarily 
higher benefit amounts enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
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of 2009. In 2014 SNAP expenditures had begun to go down and were at $74 
billion. 
 
Figure 2.  Average Means-tested Program Spending per Participant for Selected 
Years, in constant 2012 Dollars6  
 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Growth in Means-Tested Programs and 
Tax Credits for Low-Income Households, 2013  
 
The safety net housing assistance programs in the United States provide 
aid in two principal forms: project-based aid (or public housing), where subsidies 
are tied to units constructed for low-income households, and household-based 
subsidies, where renters choose housing units in the existing private housing stock 
and are provided rental assistance vouchers. Public housing is funded in large part 
at the federal level but is operated by independent public housing authorities that 
make decisions about eligibility in adherence with federal rules and regulations. 
The school lunch and breakfast programs provide federal support for 
meals served by public and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, 
and residential child care institutions, that enroll and offer free or reduced-price 
meals to low-income children.  
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) provides vouchers for food purchase, supplemental food, and 
                                            
6  AFDC/ TANF per-participant spending data was not available.  
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nutrition risk screening and related nutrition-oriented services to low-income 
pregnant women and low-income women and their children (up to age 5).  
Head Start is an early childhood education program to improve social 
competence, learning skills, health, and the nutrition status of low-income 
children so that they can begin school on an equal basis with their peers from 
more economically successful families. 
 
2.2. EITC and TANF: Caseloads and Poverty 
 
Through the 1996 welfare reform and subsequent policy changes the U.S. 
safety net has been transformed in striking ways for the nonelderly; Table 1 
shows the reduction in AFDC/TANF expenditures, which historically went to 
nonworkers, and the increase in EITC benefits, which go overwhelmingly to low-
income workers with children. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 encouraged 
former AFDC welfare recipients to enter the labor market. The tighter eligibility 
rules of TANF and policy-orientated increases of the EITC—in combination with 
rapid economic growth—“caused” a sharp decrease in the number of welfare 
recipients since 1996. However, the decline in the number of welfare recipients 
(AFDC/TANF) from 12.3 million to 4.5 million from 1996 to 2005 (63 percent) 
did not have a significant impact on unemployment during the same period; see 
Figure 1.  
Studies have shown that the EITC has encouraged large numbers of single 
parents to leave welfare and enter into work. The Committee for Economic 
Development, an organization of 250 corporate executives and university 
presidents, concluded in 2000 that “[t]he EITC has become a powerful force in 
dramatically raising the employment of low-income women in recent years.” In 
2013, the EITC lifted 6.2 million people out of poverty in the United States, 
including 3.2 million children.7 Without the EITC, the poverty rate among 
children would have been nearly one-fourth higher. The EITC lifts more children 
out of poverty than any other single program or category of programs.8 
                                            
7  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 2014. 
8  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 2014. 
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Figure 3.  Number of Recipients of AFDC/TANF and EITC, and 
Unemployment, 1970-2013 (millions) 
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An evaluation by Danziger suggests that, in its first few years, the 1996 
welfare reform was more successful in some dimensions (notably, reducing 
caseloads) than in others (raising disposable income).9 The dramatic caseload 
decline did not cause the surge in poverty or homelessness that many critics of the 
1996 Act predicted, because most former recipients did find jobs. Even though 
many welfare leavers were not working full-time, full-year, and many were, and 
continue, working at low-wage jobs, a significant number were earning at least as 
much as they had received in cash welfare benefits and some had higher net 
income. However, despite the large caseload reduction, the U.S. poverty rate fell 
rather little following welfare reform and rose for 6 consecutive years (2006–
2012) reaching an 19-year-high (15 percent in 2012). In 2013, the official poverty 
rate was 14.5 percent, down for the first time since 2006.10 Many who have left 
welfare for work remain poor and continue to depend on Food Stamps, Medicaid, 
and other government assistance; others have left welfare and remain poor but do 
not receive the Food Stamp or Medicaid benefits to which they remain entitled. 
The extent of economic hardship remains high because many former and current 
                                            
9  S.H. Danziger, “Chapter 1 – Introduction. What Are the Early Lessons?” in Economic 
Conditions and Welfare Reform, ed. S.H. Danziger (Michigan: Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 2009). 
10  DeNavas-Walt, C. et al. “Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013: Current Population 
Reports.” U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration. U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
11 
welfare recipients have limited earning prospects in a labor market that 
increasingly demands higher skills.  
 
2.3. Social Spending in the United States 
 
Between 1975, the first year the EITC existed, and 2012, total spending on 
all means-tested cash and in-kind transfers rose from 1 percent to 4 percent of 
GDP.11 However, in 2012, 40 percent of that spending was dedicated to Medicaid. 
This is important because while the growth in spending for health care programs 
(primarily Medicaid) stemmed from greater spending per participant, growth in 
spending for other means-tested programs resulted primarily from increases in the 
number of participants due to changing economic conditions – most significantly 
the recession that occurred between 2007 and 2009 and the slow recovery that 
followed. In other words, the U.S. has not made significantly greater investments 
in benefits for non-healthcare, anti-poverty programs, there has however, been an 
increase in need.  
The contrast in levels in social expenditures between the United States and 
other OECD countries is striking.12 Smeeding calculates a consistent set of social 
expenditures (including cash, near-cash, and housing expenditures) as a 
percentage of GDP for five groups of countries—Scandinavia; Northern 
Continental Europe; Central and Southern Europe; “Anglo” (Australia, Canada, 
and the U.K.); and the United States—between 1980 and 1999.13 Spending ranges 
between 2.7 and 3.6 percent of GDP in the United States, a far lower level than 
every other country group. The other Anglo countries averaged between 4.8 and 
7.8 percent of GDP, similar to the Central and Southern European counties. 
Northern Europe and the Scandinavian countries averaged between 8.1 and 15.3 
percent of GDP. The trends across country groups vary, although most country 
groups increased expenditures as a share of GDP between 1980 and 1999. The 
United States did not. 
 
                                            
 
12  See K. Caminada, and K.P. Goudswaard, “Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction in the EU: A 
Descriptive Analysis,” Poverty & Public Policy 1 (2), Article 5 (2009): 1-51; and K. 
Caminada, and K.P. Goudswaard, “Social Income Transfers and Poverty Alleviation OECD 
Countries,” Leiden University Research Memorandum Department of Economics #2010.01. 
13  T.M. Smeeding, “Poverty, Work, and Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” 
in Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, ed. David 
Grusky, Third Edition. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 327-329. 
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2.4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
  
From 1935 until 1996, the centerpiece of the United States Federal 
Government (U.S.F.G.) welfare policy was a program entitled Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) whose principal benefit was the provision of 
cash assistance to needy families. In 1996, however, the U.S.F.G. dramatically 
shifted its poverty reduction strategies by implementing large-scale social welfare 
reform aimed at making “welfare a transition to work” by officially becoming a 
temporary assistance program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
1996).14 The legislative basis for the reform was the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).15 PRWORA 
terminated the AFDC program.16 In place of AFDC, PRWORA introduced a new 
program known as Block Grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). 
There are significant differences between TANF and the AFDC program 
that it supplanted in 1996. TANF marked a break from the policy objectives, 
eligibility rules, funding, time limitations, and work requirements under AFDC. 
The changes have had serious implications for the families who continue to 
receive benefits under TANF as well as for those families who no longer 
participate. In the United States today, 19 years after PRWORA was passed and 
TANF replaced AFDC, it is not clear that the reform has achieved the intended 
results.17 
While Europe and the United States have always had differences in their 
social safety net policies, the implementation of TANF, in place of AFDC, really 
marks the U.S. policy going in a drastically different direction than that taken in 
many European States. The remainder of this working paper details the most 
                                            
14  Welfare reform included a series of policy changes through the passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. For this paper, we address welfare reform 
through a component of that Act, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and its 
relationship to the prior law, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See, for details, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193), 1996. 
15  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 included the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families Block Grants as a component, which is the primary matter of 
discussion in this paper. However, the legislation’s passage also included almost 55 million 
dollars in cuts to low-income assistance programs including food stamps, benefits to legal 
immigrants, and the SSI program for children with disabilities. PRWORA also included a child 
support enforcement system as well as provided mandatory funds ($50 million annually) in 
abstinence education funding. 
16  TANF replaced not only AFDC, but also two accompanying programs, the Emergency 
Assistance Program and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program.  
17  Danziger, “Chapter 1 – Introduction. What Are the Early Lessons?”.  
13 
significant differences between AFDC and TANF. We begin by examining the 
underlying tenants and policy objectives of the two programs including the impact 
that increased U.S. State discretion has had on welfare in the United States. 
Following the policy overview, the paper surveys the literature evaluating the 
successes and failures of welfare reform. Finally, the paper considers some of 
welfare reform’s unintended consequences and the overall impact of welfare 
reform on the U.S.’s neediest families.  
  
3. POLICY OVERVIEW 
 
This section of the paper walks through the differences between Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families. It begins with an overview of the two policies’ objectives, to provide 
some understanding about the significance of the move from a program that solely 
provides support to a program that also emphasizes work. The policy objectives 
section is followed by an overview of the major changes made when TANF 
replaced AFDC including the increased flexibility and discretion of States, the 
funding changes in moving from an entitlement to a block grant, the differences in 
eligibility requirements, the implementation of time limits, and the changes in 
work requirements. 
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 was incredibly controversial. It was considered by 
many in the social policy and political communities to be too great a compromise 
with very conservative members of the United States Congress, even leading to 
the resignation of several presidential advisors and officials at the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services. One such advisor, former assistant 
secretary of children and families, Mary Jo Bane, in an article titled “Welfare as 
We Might Know It,” in The American Prospect (January/February 1997), stated, 
“The public, rightly, wanted welfare reform that expected work and parental 
responsibility. The political rhetoric supporting the new law, unfortunately, made 
the concept of a federal entitlement synonymous with irresponsibility and lifelong 
dependency, and the replacement of the entitlement with block grants 
synonymous with work requirements. This rhetoric was misleading but 
powerfully effective.”18  
 
                                            
18  D. Cabe, “Welfare to Work,” Kennedy School Bulletin, Harvard University, Boston, MA, 
2002. 
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3.1. Policy Objectives 
 
The underlying purpose of U.S.F.G. welfare policy has always been to 
reduce poverty by providing assistance to the country’s neediest families. While 
this fundamental mission remained unchanged following the welfare reform of 
1996, the policy tools used to achieve that mission, and the programs 
implemented, changed significantly with the passage of PRWORA. The 
replacement of the country’s primary cash assistance program, from AFDC to 
TANF, represented not only a change in name, but a serious policy shift that 
revised poverty reduction strategies throughout the United States. 
AFDC was established through the Social Security Act of 1935. The 
policy’s objective was to reduce poverty through the provision of cash welfare to 
needy children suffering from lack of parental support due to their mother or 
father being incapacitated, deceased, absent from the home, or unemployed.19 
AFDC was accompanied by an employment training and education program 
called the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program (JOBS) and an emergency 
cash assistance program called Emergency Assistance (EA).20 Although the 
funding for these programs was separate from AFDC funding, individuals could 
participate in the JOBS program only if they also participated in AFDC.21  
AFDC was administered and supervised by U.S. States but was strongly 
regulated according to guidelines issued by the U.S.F.G. The U.S.F.G. established 
eligibility rules for the AFDC program, while the individual U.S. States set their 
own benefit levels and established income and resource limits.22 AFDC benefit 
levels established by U.S. States were required to be uniformly applied to all 
families with similar circumstances within the State.23 
In 1996, under the Clinton Administration, the passage of PRWORA came 
with the promise to “change welfare as we know it.”24 The principal vehicle for 
achieving this change was the introduction of TANF to replace AFDC. TANF 
terminated open-ended welfare funding and instituted a block grant program 
                                            
19  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview, 2004. 
20  The Emergency Assistance Program provided short-term emergency assistance to needy 
families. This assistance was not dependent upon participation in AFDC. 
21  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
22  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
23  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
24  Urban Institute, Welfare Reform: Ten Years Later, Washington, DC, 2006. 
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providing each U.S. State, meeting certain criteria, with a fixed sum and increased 
flexibility in policy choice. AFDC was considered open-ended because U.S. 
States were entitled to reimbursement from the U.S.F.G. without a funding cap.25 
In contrast, TANF is administered as a block grant program in which U.S. States 
are provided with a determined amount of federal funding but allowed greater 
discretion over the way the funding is spent. As an ideological matter, whereas 
AFDC focused primarily on providing families with the means to survive, TANF 
emphasizes employment and makes welfare temporary in nearly all cases.26  
Through TANF U.S. States use U.S.F.G. block grants to operate their own 
programs. States can use TANF dollars in ways designed to meet any of the four 
policy objectives set out in the federal law, which are to: (1) provide assistance to 
needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the 
homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government 
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and 
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual 
numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; 
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.27 
The shift from AFDC to TANF marked more than a move from an open-
ended cash-assistance program to a temporary-assistance program. TANF also 
introduced the practice of allowing welfare funding for programs aimed at 
influencing the family structure, including family planning and two-parent-family 
maintenance programs. This change reflects a shift in poverty reduction strategies 
in the United States. Whereas AFDC was designed to provide needy families with 
cash transfers that would supplement or replace employment income, TANF 
focused on the importance of work as well as attempting to foster nuclear families 
as a way to provide family economic stability.  
 
3.2. The Role of State Discretion 
 
PRWORA provided U.S. States with unprecedented discretion over 
welfare programming and funding. Under TANF, there are no federal rules that 
determine the amount of TANF cash benefits that must be paid to a participating 
family. Additionally, there are no federal rules that require U.S. States to use 
                                            
25  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
26  O.A. Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program 
to Assess Changing Social Policies (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2005). 
27  M. Covin, An Introduction to TANF (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
2005). 
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TANF to pay families cash benefits at all; however, all States do so.28 Benefit 
amounts are determined solely by the U.S. States. The discretion provided to 
States through TANF has allowed for a great diversity in the way that welfare 
programs are funded and administered across the country. Each U.S. State has 
different initial eligibility thresholds, benefit payment amounts, and fund 
allocations.29 
 According to Falk of the Congressional Research Service (2014), in July of 
2012, for the average cash welfare family (a family of three), the maximum 
monthly benefit in the median state (North Dakota) was $427, with a range from 
$923 in Alaska to $170 in Mississippi.30 The maximum monthly cash benefit is 
usually paid to a family that receives no other income (no earned or unearned 
income) and who complies with program rules. Families with income other than 
TANF are often paid a reduced benefit amount. The diversity in program 
administration also extends to the initial eligibility threshold. Initial eligibility 
thresholds for families of three range from $1,740 in Hawaii to $269 in 
Alabama.31 
 State discretion has also created significant diversity in the way that TANF 
dollars are spent across the U.S. States particularly with reference to the level of 
cash benefits provided. The variation in the use of TANF funding spent on cash 
assistance ranges from 51 percent in Maine to only 7 percent in Illinois. Similarly, 
while several U.S. States decline to spend any of their TANF dollars on Family 
Formation programs, those encouraging two-parent families and decreasing out-
of-wedlock births, New Jersey allocates more than 30 percent of its TANF dollars 
on Family Formation expenditures.32  
 The discretion provided to U.S. States through the passage of the 1996 
welfare law allowed for a huge amount of variety in program and funds 
administration, with very few federal guidelines. Subsequently, there are different 
welfare programs being administered in every U.S. State. These programs are 
having mixed results in aiding the families who, currently or formerly, receive 
                                            
28  G. Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 
DC, 2014. 
29  A State’s initial eligibility threshold considers all the State’s financial eligibility rules 
regarding applicants, the limitations placed on gross income, the rules for deductions from 
gross income in determining net income, and any limitations placed on net income (The Urban 
Institute, 2004). Initial eligibility thresholds vary considerably across U.S. States. 
30  G. Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 
DC, 2014.  
31  Welfare Rules Database, “Initial Income Eligibility Thresholds (Family of Three) by State,” 
Welfare Rules Database Data Set 1e4-2 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2013). 
32  Schott, L, et al. “How States Have Spent Federal and State Funds Under the TANF Block 
Grant.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington DC, 2012.  
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assistance through TANF and make it difficult to evaluate welfare reform’s 
success as a whole.  
 Several commentators feared that TANF might set off a “race to the 
bottom,” where States, fearful of attracting low-income families from other 
States, might lower benefits, which in turn would cause other States to lower 
theirs. In fact, total AFDC/TANF spending on cash benefits declined from a peak 
of about $40 billion in 1995 to about $21 billion in 2006 (Table 1), but this 
reduction is roughly proportional to the welfare caseload reduction.33 
 
3.3. Funding  
 
Under TANF, the funding relationship between the U.S.F.G. and the 
individual U.S. States changed. The drastically increased level of State discretion 
over federally granted funds changed the ways in which State governments were 
spending welfare dollars and the degree to which the U.S.F.G. was providing 
funding to the States. By allocating block grant funding to U.S. States, TANF 
removed almost all federal eligibility and payment rules and provided U.S. States 
with wide discretion over programming, as well as the right to deny benefits to 
families.34 
Under AFDC, U.S. States were entitled to unlimited federal funds. The 
federal government provided reimbursement of benefit payments at “matching” 
rates that were inversely related to a U.S. State’s per capita income.35 U.S. States 
were required to provide aid to all persons who were eligible under the federal 
law and whose income and resources were within the state-set limits.36  
Under TANF, however, there is no guarantee of benefit provision. 
PRWORA simply mandated a fixed budget amount that the U.S.F.G. would grant 
to the U.S. States each year (the base amount of the yearly block grant has been 
$16.5 billion since 1996 and is not adjusted for inflation).37 U.S. States are 
required to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.4 billion in total under 
what is known as a “maintenance-of-effort” (MOE) requirement. The 1996 law 
also created supplemental grants for certain States with high population growth or 
low block grant allocations relative to their needy population (funding for this 
                                            
33  Scholz, Moffitt and Cowan, “Trends in Income Support,” 10. 
34  R. Blank, “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States. Revised,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 40 (4) (2002): 1-43.  
35  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
36  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
37  Congressional Budget Office, Federal Budget Implications of The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Congressional Budget Office Memorandum, 2006. 
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provision was eliminated in the reauthorization process beginning FY2011), as 
well as a contingency fund to help States during a recession.38 U.S. States that 
need or use more than the amount that has been granted for a particular year are 
not entitled to federal reimbursement for excess expenditures. Conversely, States 
that do not use all of their annual funding are allowed to carry over unused dollars 
from one fiscal year to the next.39  
 
Table 2. Federal TANF Funds: FY 2006- FY 2013 (in millions of dollars) 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
State family 
assistance grants 16,489 16,489 16,489 16,489 16,489 16,489 16,489 16,489 
         
Supplemental grants 319 319 319 319 319 211 
          
Healthy marriage/ 
responsible 
fatherhood grants 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
         
Grants to the 
territories 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
         
Grants for tribal 
work programs 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
         
Regular contingency 
funds 93 59 428 1,107 212 334 612 610 
         
Emergency 
contingency funds 
   
617 4,383 
   Totals 17,137 17,103 17,472 18,768 21,639 17,270 17,337 17,335 
 
Source: Falk, G. (2013). Congressional Research Service 
 
The AFDC program was funded specifically and solely to provide cash 
assistance to needy families. The corresponding JOBS and EA programs 
supplemented AFDC by providing vocational training and short-term emergency 
                                            
38  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families, 2009. 
39  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
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program funding, respectively.40 Under TANF, however, States may direct federal 
funding toward any program that is within TANF’s objectives, including 
programming that would have formerly been funded through the JOBS or EA 
programs. In the absence of federally mandated cash assistance requirements, 
many U.S. States have opted to spend less on cash assistance and more on the 
other programming that falls under the provisions of TANF such as childcare, or 
work support programs. Thus, with the transition from AFDC to TANF the 
number of families receiving income assistance fell sharply. In 2013, most TANF 
funds, 66 percent, were spent on areas other than income assistance. This is a 
significant shift. In fiscal year 1997, states spent about 23 percent of TANF funds 
on services other than cash assistance. In fiscal year 2013 the United States spent 
31.5 billion dollars on TANF. (This number includes both the federal expenditure 
and the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) funding.) Only 28 percent of TANF dollars 
went toward providing families with cash assistance (8 percent went to work 
related activities and supports, 16 percent went to childcare, 8 percent went to 
refundable tax credits, 7 percent went to administration and systems, and 34 
percent went to other areas).41 
Annex B shows U.S. States variation in using TANF dollars. As a result, 
government aid across the nation varies remarkably; see Annex C. As millions of 
people seek aid, they are finding a complex system that reaches some and rejects 
others for “unpredictable” reasons. For example, the share of poor children and 
parents (below 100 percent of the poverty line) that receive cash welfare ranges 
from 2 percent in Idaho and Wyoming to over 45 percent in Maine, California, 
and Vermont—the U.S. average amounts to 21 percent. See Figure 3. 
To conclude, the increase in State discretion over the use of their federal 
welfare dollars has decreased the provision of cash assistance to needy families. 
U.S. States are opting to utilize federal funding to provide assistance to needy 
families through means other than direct cash transfers.  
 
                                            
40  U.S. Government Accountability Office (2015). TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 
FAMILIES: An Overview of Spending, Federal Oversight, and Program Incentives. GAO-15-
572T: Published: Apr 30, 2015. Publicly Released: Apr 30, 2015. 
41  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families. 
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Figure 4. Rate of Poor Children and Parents that Receive Cash Welfare, FY 2013 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Current 
Population Survey 
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3.4. Eligibility 
 
Welfare reform also had a significant impact on eligibility for assistance. 
Under AFDC, the U.S.F.G. provided cash assistance along with education and 
training programming indefinitely so long as a family qualified under the 
eligibility criteria. One of the most striking ways that TANF limited eligibility 
was through the implementation of time limits; this aspect of eligibility is 
discussed in section 3.5. In addition to establishing time limits, PRWORA 
tightened eligibility requirements both by providing U.S. States with the 
discretion to deny benefits and by reducing the base population who were eligible 
to receive federal assistance.  
Prior to welfare reform, persons meeting financial eligibility requirements 
under AFDC were provided cash benefits from the government. AFDC did not 
include restrictions based on marital status or citizenship. Minor, unwed mothers 
as well as persons convicted of drug-related crimes were provided unrestricted 
benefits under the former welfare program. Legally residing immigrants were also 
eligible for benefits under AFDC. There were no limits on the size of a family that 
could be eligible for AFDC benefits; therefore, when an additional child was 
born, families were provided with additional benefits.  
PRWORA imposed new conditions and restrictions to program 
participation. Since the passage of welfare reform, persons who have been 
convicted of a drug-related crime are prohibited for life from receiving benefits 
under TANF. Unmarried minor parents are provided benefits only if living with 
an adult or if in an adult-supervised setting and participating in education and 
training programs.42 U.S. States were given the discretion to exclude both legal 
immigrants who were new applicants to welfare as well as the right to exclude 
even those legal immigrants already receiving assistance under the prior welfare 
program.43 While the federal guidelines under TANF do not limit eligibility based 
on family size, the policy does provide individual U.S. States with that 
discretion.44  
 
                                            
42  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
43  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
44  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Overview. 
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3.5. Time Limits 
 
The most notable eligibility change through the passage of PRWORA 
might be the implementation of time limits in establishing the duration for which 
a family can qualify for benefits. Under TANF, families who have received 
federally funded assistance for five cumulative years are ineligible for additional 
federal cash assistance. This means that even if employment adequate to provide 
family stability is not found, at the end of five cumulative years, families are 
removed from the program and can never again participate. 
AFDC’s designation as an entitlement program ensured that U.S. States 
would receive funding from the U.S.F.G. as long as the States adhered to the 
federal requirements. Benefits were then guaranteed to eligible participants in the 
AFDC program.45 Moreover, under AFDC, program participants remained 
eligible as long as they met the program’s established rules. Because there were 
no time restrictions to participation in AFDC, families remained eligible for cash 
assistance as long as they were below the initial eligibility threshold established 
by each individual U.S. State and continued to meet the program requirements 
issued by the U.S.F.G. and the U.S. State of residence.  
The establishment of time limits is one of the most consequential changes 
affecting families on welfare in the United States. The U.S. minimum wage plays 
a role in the ability of less-skilled workers to earn adequate incomes even if fully 
employed.46 The inability to find employment at a living wage and maintain it 
while addressing health issues and child care have caused barriers for families in 
establishing financial security, particularly the very poor (families living below 50 
percent of the poverty line) and single-mother-headed households.47 In spite of 
these difficulties, welfare does not provide federal benefits to participants once 
the time limit has expired.48 TANF does not ensure that, after the program 
eligibility time limit is tolled, participating families have secured work that will 
                                            
45  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
46  According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the federal minimum wage is $6.55 per hour 
effective 24 July 2008. The federal minimum wage provisions are contained in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. Many U.S. States also have minimum wage laws. In cases where an employee 
is subject to both the state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee is entitled to the 
higher of the two minimum wages. 
47  W.L. Primus, Rawlings, K. Larin, and K. Porter, The Initial Impact of Welfare Reform on the 
Economic Well-being of Single Mother Families (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, 1999). 
48  States are allowed to exempt a minority of people from time limits and are allowed to continue 
paying benefits through State funds. 
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enable them to provide basic necessities or even offset the cost of childcare or 
transportation that work often requires.  
 Moreover, recipients who reach the time limits or who are sanctioned for 
not finding a job are being denied cash assistance even though they are willing to 
work, because they cannot find any employer to hire them. This labor demand 
problem will increase during recessions and will remain even in good economic 
times because employer demands for a skilled workforce continue to escalate. 
Note that the “time limit and out” system differs markedly from a “time limit 
followed by a work-for-welfare opportunity of last resort” initially proposed by 
President Clinton’s advisors, but rejected by Congress.49 
 
3.6. Work Requirements and Activities 
 
Although education, work participation, and financial security were 
objectives of U.S. welfare policy both before and after welfare reform, the 1996 
welfare reform placed greater responsibility on the families receiving program 
benefits to find stable and sufficiently paying work. To enable families to achieve 
this goal, TANF provided additional support targeted at finding and maintaining 
employment.  
Directly following welfare reform, U.S. States drastically altered their 
welfare programming to assist families in establishing employment. One such 
change made by U.S. States was a shift toward “work-first” welfare systems that 
reduced skills development and education programs while emphasizing job-
readiness and employment search training. U.S. States also moved toward 
“making work pay” through incentivizing work participation by raising eligibility 
thresholds or adding earned income tax credits. Additionally, U.S. States 
toughened sanctions and time limits to enforce the message that welfare would 
provide only temporary assistance.50 
Under AFDC, in fiscal year 1994, 40 percent of two-parent households 
receiving benefits were required to participate in 16 hours of work activity per 
week in order to continue participation in AFDC’s cash assistance program. 
Before the passage of PRWORA, the percentage of households required to meet 
the 16-hour work requirement was scheduled to increase to 75 percent in fiscal 
year 1997.51 In addition to the 16-hour requirement imposed on some participants, 
                                            
49  S.H. Danziger, “Approaching the Limit: Early National Lessons from Welfare Reform,” PSC 
Research Report No. 02-507 (2002a). 
50  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
51  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
24 
all AFDC recipients were required to participate in JOBS unless they were 
exempt from the program. A recipient would be exempt from JOBS participation 
if he or she worked for 30 hours or more per week, attended school full-time, 
cared for a very young child or elderly family member, or was under age 16. 
In contrast, under TANF, work participation standards require that the 
head of household in a single-parent family work at least 20 hours per week, and 
in the case of two-parent families, parents are required to work 30 hours per week 
in order to remain eligible for cash assistance. Eligible work includes subsidized 
or unsubsidized employment, on-the-job training, education programs, and 
community service. Hours spent in vocational education can count toward the 
weekly work requirement but only in a minority of U.S. States and only for a total 
of 12 months.52  
However, States are provided some flexibility in meeting their work 
requirements. The TANF statute requires U.S. States to have 50 percent of their 
caseload meet the established work participation standards (the so-called all 
families rate). In addition to the aforementioned standards, there is a separate 
participation standard that applies to two-parent families, requiring 90 percent of 
the State’s two-parent family participants to meet work participation standards.53 
States that fail the TANF work participation standards are penalized by a 
reduction in their federal block grant amounts. However, the statutory work 
participation standards are reduced by a “caseload reduction credit.”54 The 
caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard by one percentage 
point for each percent decline in the caseload.55  
 
3.8. Summary 
 
Welfare reform and the implementation of TANF centered on the 
importance of work in providing families with economic stability. The policy 
intended to provide support through programming for five years, while 
                                            
52  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, Comparison of Prior Law and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996. 
53 G. Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
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Asked Questions,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 
DC, 2014.  
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participants were able to gain employment and attain economic security. This was 
intended to be accomplished through stricter eligibility, the implementation of 
time limits, and the increased flexibility for States to meet the needs of their 
poorest residents. The programs established to assist poor families with job 
preparation and workforce engagement have been the source of a significant 
amount of welfare reform’s praise. However, because programs vary from one 
U.S. State to the next, the degree to which the work-related programs assist 
families is also varied. The changes made in the move from AFDC to TANF 
shifted from a strong federal presence with entitled funding, to a strong state 
presence with block granted funding. The shift in the way welfare is funded and 
administered has led to varied programs succeeding to varying degrees across the 
country.  
 
 
4. EVALUATING WELFARE REFORM 
 
Following the passage of PRWORA, U.S. social policy analysts and 
economists have surveyed the impact of welfare reform on helping needy families 
in the United States move out of poverty. This is a difficult task, due to the 
discretion provided to U.S. States through TANF and the resulting diversity in 
programming and implementation. There are varied opinions about TANF’s 
success in assisting the nation’s poorest families. Research institutions and 
universities have developed new and diverse proxies for examining the extent to 
which welfare reform has been successful in meeting the needs of low-income 
families in the United States as well as for identifying the reform’s failures.  
Often the reduced number of families receiving cash assistance through 
TANF is cited as evidence of the success of the 1996 welfare reform. Other 
frequently cited indications of success include the increase in employment rates 
and the decrease in child poverty that took place during the 1990s.56 However, 
this analysis only provides part of the information needed to evaluate the success 
of welfare reform in the United States. The following sections provide a review of 
data and literature evaluating welfare reform’s success in supporting families 
moving from welfare and into work, and ensuring employment and financial 
security for poor families in the United States. We attempt to cover some of the 
critical concerns of welfare reform, through a literature review organized by 
theme. The themes in this section include Employment Trends, The Effect of the 
Economy, The Very Poor and Single-Mother-Headed Households, Program 
Participation Rates, and TANF Benefits and Inflation. 
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4.1. Employment Trends 
 
Some of the employment trends observed after welfare reform were 
positive. Initially more welfare recipients were employed while receiving welfare 
benefits than they were in the past; increasing from 22 percent in 1997 to 33 
percent in 1999. Unfortunately these numbers have fallen in recent years (In FY 
2010, the employment rate of adult recipients was 22.3 percent)57, they have still 
not dropped to the levels that they were before welfare reform.58 However, a 
number of studies have found that even with increased work participation rates 
welfare and former welfare recipients are struggling to establish financial 
security.  
One of the primary goals of welfare reform was for participants to 
establish “stable, long-term work patterns,” under the assumption that regular 
involvement in work will improve their well-being. The justification for 
establishing only temporary assistance is that this approach provides support and 
impetus for families to become stably employed, which will be in the best interest 
of the participating families. Indeed, studies indicated that employment among 
former welfare recipients increased after welfare reform was enacted, and that 
when recipients left the TANF program their employment rate was 5 to 10 percent 
higher than when they left AFDC.59  
In the late 1990s, when families left the welfare system, they were more 
likely to have at least one working adult than they were prior to the 
implementation of TANF.60 However, in the tougher labor market of 2002 and 
2003, the proportion of former welfare recipients in the workforce fell from 63 
percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2002.61 Evaluations of welfare-to-work typically 
report that while most participants are able to secure initial employment, a large 
proportion, often a majority, lose those jobs within a year. Additionally, low 
wages among welfare recipients remain a concern. While research suggests that 
wages of former welfare recipients grow over time, this phenomenon occurs 
among only the minority of former recipients who are able to establish regular, 
stable full-time work patterns.62  
                                            
57  Office of Family Assistance (2012).Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF 
Recipients, Fiscal Year 2010. U.S. department of Health and Human Services. 
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59  S.K. Danziger, M.E. Corcoran, S.H. Danziger, and C.M. Heflin, “Work, Income and Material 
Hardship After Welfare Reform,” Journal of Consumer Affairs 34 (1) (2000): 6-30. 
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61  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
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A study conducted by Danziger et al. found that the former welfare 
recipients with the most work participation and experience have higher levels of 
financial success and subjective well-being than those without employment.63 
However, they also found that there were a large number of respondents who 
suffered from financial hardship regardless of their level of work involvement. 
The study concluded that employment is associated with “reductions in, but not 
the elimination of, economic vulnerability and material hardships” for welfare and 
former welfare recipients in the United States. 
 
4.2. The Effect of the Economy 
 
The fact that PRWORA was passed during a time of rapid and sustained 
economic growth complicates efforts to determine the extent to which certain 
phenomena such as increased employment and decreased poverty levels can 
properly be attributed to welfare policy reform. In the United States between 1992 
and 2000, the labor market increased by 20 million jobs.64 The U.S. 
unemployment rate fell to 5 percent in early 1997, and remained at or below that 
level until October of 2001.65 Many businesses experienced worker shortages in 
the years following the passage of the 1996 legislation, making employers 
increasingly open to hiring ex-welfare recipients. Additionally, wages among 
less-skilled and less-educated workers started to rise in 1995, for the first time 
since the late 1970s. 
During this time, less-educated, single mothers increasingly joined the 
workforce; whereas 62 percent of this population was employed in 1995, by 2000, 
73 percent were working.66 While this is impressive growth, the extent to which it 
can be attributed to welfare reform is ambiguous. Welfare reform policies might 
have increased the number of women in the workforce through job training and 
work incentives, but it is unclear to what degree the increase was a result of 
policy, and to what degree it was the result of a strong economy.67  
More recent evidence suggests that the economic expansion of the mid- to 
late 1990s may account for a significant percentage of the positive trends 
observed among needy families during this time. While the booming economy of 
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the 1990s correlated with a decrease in child poverty and an increase in low-
educated single parents joining the workforce, those numbers began to change in 
the years following the recession in 200368 and continued to worsen following the 
recession ending in 2009. Moreover, attributing the successes of the mid-1990s to 
the implementation of TANF is also improbable because to do so would suggest 
that the 1996 reform yielded almost immediate results. Kaushal et al. suggest that 
given that some policies might have delayed results, it is difficult to attribute the 
success of the 1990s solely to welfare reform and the implementation of TANF.69  
The recession that started in 2007 and ended in 2009 proved to be a 
significant test for TANF’s ability to support poor families in times of economic 
crises. TANF programs responded only modestly to the increased poverty and 
unemployment connected to the recession. While entitlement programs like 
SNAP increased significantly (in 2012, more than 46 million people received 
SNAP benefits - a 76 percent increase since 2007)70 at its peak in 2010 TANF 
caseloads increased by only 16 percent. Unemployment, however, rose 88 percent 
over the same time period. In 2011, TANF caseloads fell 5 percentage points from 
their 2010 peak, while the unemployment rate remained at or above 8.5 percent 
throughout the same year.71 
  
4.3. The Very Poor and Single-Mother-Headed Households 
 
While welfare reform, along with a robust and incredibly successful 
economy, may have initially decreased child poverty and increased some 
employment rates, the reform had an unintended and significant negative effect on 
the very poor. Haskins found that “there is a small to moderate-sized group of 
mother-headed families that are worse off than they were before welfare 
reform.”72 Shortly after TANF was implemented, the nation’s poorest families 
were not benefiting from the success of the economy or the policies of welfare 
reform. Primus et al. found that from 1995 to 1997 disposable income for the 
poorest 20 percent of the population declined by 7.6 percent and the poorest 10 
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Substantially during Recent Period of Labor Market Weakness (Washington, DC: Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2004). 
69  Kaushal et al., “Welfare Reform and Family Expenditures: How are Single Mothers Adapting 
to the New Welfare and Work Regime?”. 
70  Zedlewski, S., et.al. (2012). SNAP’s Role in the Great Recession and Beyond. The Urban 
Institute. 
71  Pavetti, L. (2013) TANF Provided a Weak Safety Net During and After Recession. Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities. 
72  R. Haskins, “Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Income and Poverty,” in The New World of 
Welfare, eds. R. Blank and R. Haskins (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).  
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percent of the population experienced a 15.2 percent decline in discretionary 
income.73 
Following welfare reform, the number of single mothers in the United 
States who were receiving cash assistance, then through TANF, fell by two 
million. However, employment among single mothers grew by only one million. 
Therefore, in the United States there were approximately one million unemployed 
single mothers who were not receiving any cash assistance from the government. 
This number is almost double what it was before welfare reform (up from 
6,000,000).74 The size of this group grew from 9.8 percent of participants leaving 
the program in 1999 to 13.8 percent in 2002.75 The population of single mothers 
who are disconnected from both employment and government cash assistance is 
significantly more likely to be in poor physical and mental health as well as less 
ready for employment than those who left welfare for job opportunities.76  
A qualitative study conducted on TANF recipients in Maine analyzed the 
barriers to employment that prevented single mothers from being able to establish 
and maintain work. The study, by Butler, looked at women who were 
participating in the TANF program but who were struggling to maintain stable 
employment.77 Butler’s study identified several social and health issues that 
prevented the women in her study from achieving steady employment. The three 
most prevalent phenomena observed were domestic violence, raising children 
with disabilities, and long-term physical and mental health problems (the latter 
affecting 33-44 percent of TANF recipients nation-wide). Butler also found that 
not only are welfare recipients disproportionately affected by these issues, but 
often must cope with more than one simultaneously.  
Recent findings from Moffitt suggest that the reduction in support to the 
very poor and to single mothers is endemic in the U.S. welfare system. While 
spending for the elderly and the disabled through the U.S. welfare system has 
increased in recent years, there have been significantly slower increases, if not 
decreases, in supports for single mothers and their children. Further, Moffitt finds 
that support for families with the lowest incomes has decreased, but support for 
those with higher incomes has increased.78 In fact, Moffitt found that there was a 
                                            
73  Primus et al., The Initial Impact of Welfare Reform on the Economic Well-being of Single 
Mother Families. 
74  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
75  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
76  Golden, Assessing the New Federalism: Eight Years Later. An Urban Institute Program to 
Assess Changing Social Policies. 
77  S. Butler, “Long-Term TANF Participants and Barriers to Employment: A Qualitative Study in 
Maine,” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare XXXV (3) (September 2008). 
78  Moffitt, R. (2015). The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System. 
Demography (2015) 52:729–749. 
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significant shift in welfare spending, for those living in deep poverty —as little as 
50 percent of the federal poverty line—to those with incomes as much as 200 
percent above the poverty line. In 2014, a family of four earning $11,925 a year 
likely got less aid than a same-sized family earning $47,700.79 
  
4.4. Program Participation Rates 
 
Reduced program participation is often presented as evidence that welfare 
reform is working to move people out of poverty. However, there are serious 
concerns with using reduced welfare caseloads as a proxy for welfare reform’s 
success. While increased work involvement has certainly accounted for reduced 
participation in the TANF program, Parrott and Sherman point out that, despite 
the reduction in caseloads, in recent years the number of children living below 
half of the poverty line has grown significantly.80 While the number of families in 
this category has increased, the rate at which eligible families are receiving TANF 
benefits has declined. Even when using the supplemental poverty measure, which 
takes into account noncash benefits such as food assistance, the number of 
children in families living in deep poverty (below half of the poverty line) has 
grown significantly.81 
This increased deep poverty is a concerning trend. Child poverty, in the 
years following the 2007 recession also surpassed the levels that were seen in the 
years immediately preceding the welfare reform of 1996, and the growing rates of 
intense poverty raise doubts about TANF’s ability to reach the most impoverished 
families. Before the 1996 welfare reform, the AFDC program lifted 64 percent of 
otherwise deeply poor children out of deep poverty. Conversely, in 2010, the 
TANF program lifted just 24 percent of deeply poor children above 50 percent of 
the poverty line.82 TANF programming does not seem to be addressing the needs 
of the poorest families in the United States, which is evidenced through both the 
increase in deep poverty and the rates at which this population is participating in 
TANF.  
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program83 and the Medicaid 
Program, which provide food stamps and healthcare, respectively, have continued 
                                            
79  Moffitt, R. (2015). The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System. 
Demography (2015) 52:729–749. 
80  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. (2014). TANF at 18. 
81  Short, K. (2014). The Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2013. Current Population reports. The 
United States Census Bureau.  
82  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families. 
83  Commonly referred to as food stamps. Gross monthly income eligibility limits are set at 130 
percent of the poverty level for the household size. Net monthly income limits are set at 100 
percent of poverty (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 2009a; 
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to assist a growing number of low-income families, while TANF participation has 
continued to drop.84 The Congressional Budget Office reports that unlike the 
trends seen in program participation in TANF, the other four major poverty 
reduction initiatives have seen significant growth in participation over the last 
several years.85 Moreover each of these programs served more low-income 
families than did TANF. In addition to serving more people than the major 
welfare legislation, the U.S.F.G. also provides more funding for the other four 
major poverty reduction programs. In 2012, the federal government spent $17 
billion on TANF, compared with $80 billion on Food Assistance, $50 billion on 
Supplemental Security Income benefits, and $54 billion for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit. 
The number of families who are eligible to participate in TANF, but who 
do not, is remarkably high not only with reference to participation in other 
poverty reduction programs, but also when compared with AFDC. According to 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 2011 only 33.9 percent of 
families who were eligible for TANF assistance participated in the program.86 
This is a significant change. Prior to welfare reform, more than 80 percent of 
families that qualified for AFDC participated in the program. Moreover, a simple 
linear trend shows that participation of AFDC/TANF decreased by an average of 
3 points each year in the period 1996-2011. See Figure 5. 
 
                                                                                                                       
2009b). Participation in the food stamps program is not taken into account when measuring a 
household’s poverty, as food stamps are not a cash benefit. Following the 1996 Welfare 
Reform, participation in this program includes a work requirement. 
84  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
85  Congressional Budget Office, Changes in Participation of Means Tested Programs, 2005. 
86  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Annual report to Congress. Indicators of 
Welfare Dependence, 2014. 
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Figure 5. Rates of Participation in AFDC and TANF by Families that Meet 
Eligibility Requirements 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Welfare Indicators and 
Risk Factors, 2014). 
 
 
The decline in welfare caseloads, a figure that was once frequently 
marshaled as proof of welfare reform’s success, has increasingly been accepted as 
an inadequate measure of whether or not the program is working. Unfortunately, 
it is clear that reduced caseloads do not indicate that poor and low-income 
families are more financially successful and stable than they were before welfare 
reform, but rather that poor families are simply not participating in the program. 
As stated by Parrott and Sherman: “More than half of the decline in TANF 
caseloads since 1996 is due to a decline in the extent to which TANF programs 
serve families that are poor enough to qualify, rather than to a reduction in the 
number of families who are poor enough to qualify for aid.”87 
 
                                            
87  Parrott and Sherman, TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed Than Often Understood. 
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4.5. TANF Benefits and Inflation 
 
There are also significant concerns about the degree of help that TANF is 
providing to the families who are participating in the program. The basic TANF 
block grant that the U.S.F.G. makes available has been set at $16.5 billion since it 
was established in 199688 (Table 3). As a result, the real value of the block grant 
has already fallen by about 32 percent.89 In addition, Seventeen states had the 
same nominal benefit levels in July 2014 as in 1996, meaning that benefits have 
fallen in inflation-adjusted terms by more than 30 percent.90  
 
Table 3. Basic TANF Block Grant in Constant FY1997 Dollars 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Value of the Basic TANF 
Block Grant in 1997 Dollars 
Cumulative Loss in 
Value (in percent) 
1997 $16.50  
 1998 16.2 -1.60% 
1999 15.9 -3.5 
2000 15.4 -6.4 
2001 14.9 -9.4 
2002 14.7 -10.7 
2003 14.4 -12.7 
2004 14.1 -14.7 
2005 13.6 -17.4 
2006 13.1 -20.4 
2007 12.8 -22.2 
2008 12.3 -25.5 
2009 12.3 -25.3 
2010 12.1 -26.5 
2011 11.8 -28.4 
2012 11.5 -30.1 
2013 11.3 -31.2 
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Welfare Indicators and 
Risk Factors, 2014). 
 
                                            
88  Falk, “The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions.” 
89  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families. 
90  Floyd, I. & Schott, L. (2014). TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in 
Most States and Continue to Erode. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  
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The value of both the TANF block grant and the connected TANF benefits 
continue to fall, even in times when need has increased. A study by Floyd & 
Schott found that TANF benefits have declined in real (inflation-adjusted dollars) 
in every U.S. State since the passage of PRWORA.91 The same study found that 
as of 2014, every state’s TANF benefits for a family of three with no other cash 
income were below 50 percent of the poverty line as measured by the poverty 
guidelines. In 1996, 16 states had benefit levels below 30 percent of the poverty 
line; today, 33 states and the District of Columbia do.92 In six U.S. states TANF 
benefits are below their nominal 1996 levels. Benefits in Arizona, Hawaii, and 
Washington are worth at least 40 percent less than in 1996, after inflation.93 Even 
those U.S. States that have adjusted benefit levels upwards under TANF have not 
kept pace with the increased costs of basic needs. In other words, TANF benefits 
do less to help families rise out of extreme poverty than they did in 1996. The 
families who are participating in TANF are receiving benefits that do little to help 
them move out of poverty and the rate to which it is helping has continued to 
decrease over time.  
 
4.6. Summary 
 
While there are some indications that TANF had a modest positive impact 
on the employment patterns of former welfare recipients, there are also strong 
indications that the economy played a significant role in the availability of jobs. In 
tough economic times TANF is ill-prepared to address the needs of the growing 
number of people living in poverty. While the extent to which each state program 
is serving its populations varies greatly, there are some themes which can be 
established nationally: There have been negative findings in the program’s 
effectiveness in serving the very poor and single-mother-headed households; 
participation rates have gone down—even among those who remain eligible for 
the program; and inflation has led to a decline in program benefits leading to the 
reduced ability to serve needy families.  
 
 
                                            
91  Z. Schott, and L. Levinson, TANF Benefits Are Low And Have Not Kept Pace With Inflation: 
But Most States Have Increased Benefits Above a Freeze Level in Recent Years (Washington, 
DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2008). 
92  Floyd, I. & Schott, L. (2014). TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in 
Most States and Continue to Erode. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  
93  Floyd, I. & Schott, L. (2014). TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in 
Most States and Continue to Erode. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
When PRWORA was passed in 1996, it might have been the ideal time for 
welfare reform for political and pragmatic reasons. On the political side, there was 
a growing sentiment that AFDC was creating a population of welfare recipients 
that relied primarily on the government for financial support. With regard to the 
feasibility of reform, the economic climate at the time was such that there were 
more opportunities for less-skilled and low-income workers to secure 
employment at better wages than had been available in the past. Against this 
background, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid-1990s. Some of this 
decline is undoubtedly due to welfare reform, some to nonwelfare policy changes, 
some to the booming economy, and some to the interactions among them. 
However, it is a difficult task to evaluate U.S. welfare reform, because with the 
passage of PRWORA and the increase in U.S. State discretion, there are different 
programs, eligibility requirements, and benefit amounts in every U.S. State. We 
found huge variation across U.S. States, depending on ability to pay and 
preferences to meet a certain level of social standard and other (social) objectives 
such as child care, family maintenance, and work support and employment 
programs.  
The 1996 welfare reform highlights America’s emphasis on work. 
PRWORA represented a shift in the way the United States attempts to address 
poverty, as well as a general change in the philosophy about how poverty 
reduction strategies should be implemented. Although welfare reform increased 
work, the earnings of most individuals who left welfare are still below the poverty 
line, for some at 50 percent of the poverty line, even many years after their exit. 
Another drawback of this work-first approach is the termination of cash assistance 
after five years, especially for vulnerable groups with low skills. In the wake of 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (which altered spending on a number of social 
service programs) States are beginning to provide low-income families, even 
those families who have left the TANF program, with additional resources.94 
These resources are often designed to create incentives to work by providing 
supplemental payments to families’ employment-earned household income.95  
Poverty is a problem that impacts more than 1 in 7 Americans (14.5 
percent of the population). The poverty rate is even higher for children in the 
                                            
94  The welfare reform law was reauthorized by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and extended 
until 2010. The Deficit Reduction Act was intended to reduce mandatory (entitlement) federal 
spending (Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, farm subsidies, etc.) through changes in program 
requirements set by revised or new federal laws. In some cases it allows for spending on new 
programming by providing more state discretion on programs and spending.  
95  Schott and Levinson, TANF Benefits Are Low And Have Not Kept Pace With Inflation: But 
Most States Have Increased Benefits Above a Freeze Level in Recent Years. 
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United States, 19.9 percent of whom are living in poverty, with nearly one-half of 
children under the age of 3 living in poor or low-income households. It is under 
this backdrop that changes to the TANF program must be considered. TANF has 
been up for reauthorization since 2010 and has been extended for several years 
with no major changes to the program. In 2015, a TANF reauthorization draft is 
being considered in the Committee on Ways and Means in the United States 
House of Representatives and if passed would make some significant changes to 
the program, including, adding outcome measurements, eliminating the marriage 
penalty, eliminating the case load reduction credit and making very significant 
changes to the initial penalty for failing to meet requirements, as well as several 
other major changes to the program. Whether or not this legislation moves 
forward, changes to TANF are likely in the near future and carefully considering 
what has worked and what has not for poor families is a critical part of making 
successful modifications to the program.  
Our interpretation of the literature is that welfare reform policies (TANF) 
had limited success in reducing poverty. With the slowly recovering economy and 
job market, low-income families need significantly more support. Supplemental 
cash assistance programs and education and job training that aid less-skilled 
workers in both finding and sustaining employment will be necessary for welfare 
reform in the United States to be successful in reducing poverty and supporting 
families in difficult economic times. If moving people from welfare to work is the 
goal of U.S. welfare policy, it is important to ensure that a living wage can be 
obtained through work, and that the costs of childcare and transportation do not 
exceed the income gained through employment. Automatically adjusting the U.S. 
minimum wage for inflation annually might be one complementary policy change 
that would serve to support working families facing these challenges. Moreover, 
one could argue that recipients who reach time limits without meeting work 
requirements should be offered a chance to work in community service jobs in 
return for cash assistance.96  
When TANF is reauthorized, it is important that the funding allocated is 
appropriate for the program’s scope. Additionally, TANF’s goals should be 
clarified; TANF’s role as both a work program and the primary source of support 
for the most impoverished families is not realistic given the program’s resources. 
If TANF is to remain a program that addresses the needs of the poorest families in 
the United States through supplemental income, work, and family supports, it is 
critical that we address these needs adequately. TANF, as a critical component of 
the U.S. safety net, must be flexible in meeting the needs of the most 
disadvantaged families in the most difficult economic times including the ability 
to better respond to recessions and unforeseen natural disasters. Finally, for 
                                            
96  S.H. Danziger, and S.K. Danziger, “The U.S. Social Safety Net and Poverty: Lessons 
Learned and Promising Approaches,” PSC Research Report No. 05-580 (2005), 10.  
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TANF to continue to be a key piece of the U.S. effort to reduce poverty, it must 
be measured accordingly. Instead of measuring caseloads, it needs to include 
outcome measures that would allow for States to be evaluated on how well they 
are serving families, with particular attention to serving families in deep poverty 
and those with significant barriers to work.  
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Annex A:  Number of Recipients Means-tested Benefits by Program, 
1970-2013 (thousands) 
 
  
Medicaid SSI AFDC/ 
TANF 
EITC Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School 
Breakfast 
School 
Lunch 
WIC Head 
Start 
1970 
  
8466 
 
4340 
 
450 22400 
 
477 
1971 
  
10241 
 
9368 
 
800 24100 
 
398 
1972 17606
 
10947 
 
11109 
 
1040 24400 
 
379 
1973 19622 
 
10949 
 
12166 
 
1190 24700 
 
379 
1974 21462 3996 10864 
 
12862 
 
1370 24600 88 353 
1975 22007 4314 11346 6215 17064 
 
1820 24900 344 349 
1976 22815 4236 11304 6473 18549 
 
2200 25600 520 349 
1977 22832 4238 11050 5627 17077 2398 2490 26200 848 333 
1978 21965 4217 10570 5192 16001 2643 2800 26700 1181 391 
1979 21520 4150 10312 7135 17653 2842 3320 27000 1483 388 
1980 21605 4142 10774 6954 21082 3032 3600 26600 1914 376 
1981 21980 4019 11079 6717 22430 3431 3810 25800 2119 387 
1982 21603 3858 10258 6395 21717 3619 3320 22900 2189 396 
1983 21554 3901 10761 7368 21625 3857 3360 23000 2537 415 
1984 21607 4029 10831 6376 20854 4081 3430 23400 3045 442 
1985 21814 4138 10855 7432 19899 4225 3440 23600 3138 452 
1986 22515 4269 11038 7156 19429 4336 3500 23700 3312 452 
1987 23109 4385 11027 8738 19113 4461 3610 23900 3429 447 
1988 22907 4464 10915 11148 18645 4530 3680 24200 3593 448 
1989 23511 4593 10993 11696 18806 4632 3810 24200 4119 451 
1990 25255 4817 11695 12542 20049 4710 4070 24100 4517 541 
1991 28280 5118 12930 13665 22625 4786 4440 24200 4893 583 
1992 30926 5566 13773 14097 25407 4830 4920 24600 5403 621 
1993 33432 5984 14205 15117 26987 4959 5360 24900 5921 714 
1994 35053 6296 14161 19017 27474 5035 5830 25300 6477 740 
1995 36282 6514 13418 19334 26619 5130 6320 25700 6894 751 
1996 36118 6614 12321 19464 25543 5104 6580 25900 7186 752 
1997 34872 6495 10376 19391 22858 5132 6920 26300 7407 794 
1998 40649 6566 8347 20273 19791 5082 7140 26600 7367 822 
1999 40300 6557 6824 19259 18183 5154 7370 27000 7311 826 
2000 42887 6602 5778 19277 17194 5104 7550 27300 7192 858 
2001 46164 6688 5359 19593 17318 5123 7790 27500 7306 905 
2002 49329 6788 5064 21703 19096 5268 8150 28000 7491 912 
2003 51971 6902 4929 22024 21250 5231 8430 28400 7631 910 
2004 55002 6988 4748 22270 23811 5172 8900 29000 7904 906 
2005 57651 7114 4469 22752 25628 5139 9360 29600 8023 907 
2006 57754 7236 4148 23042 26549 5192 9760 30100 8088 909 
2007 56821 7360 3897 24584 26316 5108 10120 30500 8285 908 
2008 58771 7521 3801 24584 28223 
 
10610 31000 8705 907 
2009 61825 7677 4154 24757 33490 
 
11080 31300 9122 904 
2010 
 
7912 
 
27041 40302 
 
11670 31800 9175 904 
2011 
 
8113 
 
27368 44709 
 
12170 31800 8961 964 
2012 
   
27912 46609 
 
12870 30700 8908 956 
2013 
   
28168 47636 
 
13200 30400 8663 904 
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Abbreviations: Medicaid = medical assistance for aged, blind, disabled, certain pregnant women, or dependent 
children; SSI = Supplemental Security Income (federally administered cash assistance for aged, blind, and 
disabled); AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; 
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit; WIC = Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children. 
 
Source:  Scholz et al. (2008, 50-51), The United States Department of 
Agriculture, The United States Census Bureau. 
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Annex B: U.S. State Use of TANF and MOE Funds as a Percent of Total Federal TANF and State MOE 
Funding, FY 2013 
 
State  
Cash 
Assistance 
 Administration  Work 
Supports 
Child 
Care  
Work 
Supports  
Other 
Expenditures  
Total  
Alabama 
 
0.269 0.143 0.123 0.032 0.022 0.411 1 
Alaska 
 
43.3 5.2 14.1 30.7 0.6 6.0 100 
Arizona 
 
-5.8 11.7 2.3 2.7 0.1 89.0 100 
Arkansas 
 
8.4 8.9 15.0 5.5 2.0 60.2 100 
California 
 
45.9 7.9 7.2 12 2.6 24.4 100 
Colorado  
 
22.4 6.6 0.7 0.4 2.6 67.4 100 
Connecticut 
 
16.8 6.0 3.3 7.3 1.0 65.6 100 
Delaware 
 
15.5 -0.2 1.7 68.7 0 14.3 100 
District of Columbia  23.3 2.9 14.8 30.1 6.3 22.6 100 
Florida 
 
17.4 3 5.8 34.4 0.6 38.8 100 
Georgia 
 
9.6 3.2 -0.1 4.5 4.1 78.8 100 
Hawaii 
 
26.2 6.1 38.7 5.3 1.6 22.0 100 
Idaho 
 
14.2 12.1 13.5 23.3 0.6 36.4 100 
Illinois 
 
7.0 2.4 2.7 55.6 2.2 30.2 100 
Indiana 
 
10.4 6.4 5.7 27.8 12.1 37.6 100 
Iowa 
 
25.7 3.4 7.5 21.0 6.3 36.1 100 
Kansas 
 
15.8 7.8 0.2 13.0 31.2 32.0 100 
Kentucky 
 
36.8 4.3 12.3 26.8 7.8 12.1 100 
Louisiana 
 
11.6 9.2 2.9 2.4 8.6 65.4 100 
Maine 
 
51.9 2.8 12.9 10.3 12.4 9.6 100 
Maryland 
 
23.8 10.5 6.2 4.1 25.3 30.1 100 
Massachusetts 
 
29.8 2.9 0.6 26.0 9.6 31.1 100 
Michigan 
 
14.5 12.6 5.7 1.4 3.6 62.3 100 
Minnesota 
 
21.5 10.6 12.5 12.3 30.8 12.2 100 
Mississippi 
 
15.7 3.0 31.0 17.9 15.8 16.5 100 
Missouri 
 
25.1 2.3 4.3 10.5 0 57.7 100 
Montana 
 
28.6 15.7 22.6 18.6 0 14.5 100 
Nebraska 
 
22.3 3.2 17.8 21.6 33.0 2.1 100 
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Nevada 
 
48.2 9.0 2.0 0 1.3 39.4 100 
New Hampshire  32.7 16.4 9.5 12.0 1.8 27.5 100 
New Jersey  
 
23.5 6.3 6.8 5.7 14.7 43.1 100 
New Mexico  
 
24.9 5.0 4.1 17 22.3 26.8 100 
New York  
 
28.6 6.0 2.2 9.6 25.5 28.1 100 
North Carolina  
 
9.5 7.7 6.8 27.7 9.8 38.6 100 
North Dakota  
 
15,0 11.7 11.9 3.0 3.8 54.6 100 
Ohio 
 
30.1 14.6 3.6 38.1 1.0 12.6 100 
Oklahoma 
 
10,0 12.0 0 35.2 12.9 29.9 100 
Oregon 
 
43.8 11.5 5.3 3.4 1.2 34.8 100 
Pennsylvania 
 
26.0 7.7 7.5 37.9 0.9 20.0 100 
Rhode Island  
 
22.7 8.7 5.1 13.1 7.3 43.2 100 
South Carolina  
 
15.1 8.3 8.7 1.8 0.8 65.3 100 
South Dakota  
 
45.7 10.0 15.3 2.9 0.4 25.7 100 
Tennessee 
 
34.0 9.9 22.4 9.3 0 24.4 100 
Texas  
 
8.8 8.0 10.3 3.1 0.6 69.1 100 
Utah 
 
29.9 9.8 23.2 13.5 0.3 23.3 100 
Vermont  
 
21.7 7.7 0.1 31.2 27 12.3 100 
Virginia  
 
35.8 7.9 18.8 11 3.1 23.5 100 
Washington  
 
23.4 6.9 18.5 15.1 0.3 35.8 100 
West Virginia  
 
21.4 18.1 1.3 7.2 20.6 31.4 100 
Wisconsin  
 
22.2 3.8 5.7 33.1 7.9 27.3 100 
Wyoming  
 
7.5 22.5 5.4 11.1 0 53.4 100 
Totals 
 
27.6 7.2 6.4 15.8 9 33.9 100 
 
Abbreviations: MOE = States are required to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.4 billion in total under what is known as a “maintenance-of-effort” 
(MOE) requirement. Admin = Administrative Expenditures; CCFD =Child Care and Development Fund; SSBG = Social Service Block Grant. 
 
Source:  Falk (2014). Congressional Research Service based on data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
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Annex C: Variations in Participation in TANF, Unemployment Benefits and SNAP 
 
  
Share of people in poverty 
receiving TANF, FY 13 
Share of the unemployed receiving 
unemployment benefits, FY 13 
Share of eligible people that 
receive SNAP, FY 11 
United States 19 41 79 
Alabama 17 32 85 
Alaska 6 84 68 
Arizona 9 26 79 
Arkansas 5 37 74 
California 57 47 57 
Colorado 11 34 66 
Connecticut 9 59 85 
Delaware 4 43 85 
District of Columbia 5 45 99 
Florida 10 30 82 
Georgia 7 42 83 
Hawaii 11 49 61 
Idaho 1 41 85 
Illinois 8 40 84 
Indiana 10 29 71 
Iowa 13 43 87 
Kansas 8 38 69 
Kentucky 15 34 90 
Louisiana 6 25 77 
Maine 6 38 100 
Maryland 15 39 81 
Massachusetts 36 56 88 
Michigan 19 41 99 
Minnesota 12 44 77 
Mississippi 7 34 79 
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Missouri 27 36 91 
Montana 4 52 75 
Nebraska 6 36 69 
Nevada 7 42 69 
New Hampshire 3 27 78 
New Jersey 25 62 67 
New Mexico 11 37 86 
New York 30 54 79 
North Carolina 8 38 83 
North Dakota 2 38 75 
Ohio 31 33 85 
Oklahoma 7 29 85 
Oregon 21 50 100 
Pennsylvania 36 58 84 
Rhode Island 5 41 82 
South Carolina 10 30 80 
South Dakota 3 17 79 
Tennessee 40 27 95 
Texas 5 31 72 
Utah 5 29 79 
Vermont 6 46 97 
Virginia 19 25 79 
Washington 39 43 100 
West Virginia 8 49 86 
Wisconsin 24 55 89 
Wyoming 0 37 57 
 
Source:  United States Department of Agriculture, Reaching Those in Need, 2014, The National Employment Law 
Project, 2013 & the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Welfare Indicators and Risk 
Factors, 2014
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